The Human Use of Human Beings (Norbert Wiener)

The Human Use of Human Beings
by Norbert Wiener
Avon Books – (1950) 1973

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“Any labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor.”

“We have a good deal of experience as to how the industrialists regard a new industrial potential.  Their whole propaganda is to the effect that it must not be considered as the business of the government but must be left open to whatever entrepreneurs wish to invest money in it.”

In the myths and fairy tales that we read as children we learned a few of the simpler and more obvious truths of life, such as that when a djinnee is found in a bottle, it had better be left there; that the fisherman who craves a boon from heaven too many times on behalf of his wife will end up exactly where he started; that if you are given three wishes, you must be very careful what you wish for.  These simple and obvious truths represent the childish equivalent of the tragic view of life which the Greeks and many modern Europeans possess, and which is somehow missing in this land of plenty.

“Whether we entrust our decisions to machines of metal, or to those machines of flesh and blood which are bureaus and vast laboratories and armies and corporations, we shall never receive the right answers to our questions unless we ask the right questions.” 

Communication, Secrecy, and Social Policy

I am writing this book primarily for Americans in whose environment questions of information will be evaluated according to a standard American criterion: a thing is valuable as a commodity for what it will bring in the open market.  This is the official doctrine of an orthodoxy which it is becoming more and more perilous for a resident of the United States to question.  It is perhaps worth while to point out that it does not represent a universal basis of human values: that it corresponds neither to the doctrine of the Church, which seeks for the salvation of the human soul, nor to that of Marxism, which values a society for its realization of certain specific ideals of human well-being.  The fate of information in the typically American world is to become something which can be bought or sold.

It is not my business to cavil whether this mercantile attitude is moral or immoral, crass or subtle.  It is my business to show that it leads to the misunderstanding and the mistreatment of information and its associated concepts.  I shall take this up in several fields, beginning with that of patent law. (154-155)

The First and Second Industrial Revolutions

In other words, the machine plays no favorites between manual labor and white-collar labor.  Thus the possible fields into which the new industrial revolution is likely to penetrate are very extensive, and include all labor performing judgments of a low level, in much the same way as the displaced labor of the earlier industrial revolution included every aspect of human power.  There will, of course, be trades into which the new industrial revolution will not penetrate either because the new control machines are not economical in industries on so small a scale as not to be able to carry the considerable capital costs involved, or because their work is so varied that a new taping will be necessary for almost every job.  I cannot see automatic machinery of the judgment-replacing type coming into use in the corner grocery, or in the corner garage, although I can very well see it employed by the wholesale grocer and the automobile manufacturer.  The farm laborer too, although he is beginning to be pressed by automatic machinery, is protected from the full pressure of it because of the ground he has to cover, the variability of the crops he must till, and the special conditions of weather and the like that he must meet.  Even here, the large-scale or plantation farmer is becoming increasingly dependent on cotton-picking and weed-burning machinery, as the wheat farmer has long been dependent on the McCormick reaper.  Where such machines may be used, some use of machinery of judgment is not inconceivable.

I have spoken of the actuality and the imminence of this new possibility.  What can we expect of its economic and social consequences? In the first place, we can expect an abrupt and final cessation of the demand for the type of factory labor performing purely repetitive tasks.  In the long run, the deadly uninteresting nature of the repetitive task may make this a good thing and the source of leisure necessary for a man’s full cultural development.  It may also produce cultural results as trivial and wasteful as the greater part of those so far obtained from the radio and the movies.

Be that as it may, the intermediate period of the introduction of the new means, especially if it comes in the fulminating manner to be expected from a new war, will lead to an immediate transitional period of disastrous confusion.  We have a good deal of experience as to how the industrialists regard a new industrial potential.  Their whole propaganda is to the effect that it must not be considered as the business of the government but must be left open to whatever entrepreneurs wish to invest money in it.  We also know that they have very few inhibitions when it comes to taking all the profit out of an industry that there is to be taken, and then letting the public pick up the pieces.  This is the history of the lumber and mining industries, and is part of what we have called in another chapter the traditional American philosophy of progress.

Under these circumstances, industry will be flooded with the new tools to the extent that they appear to yield immediate profits, irrespective of what long-time damage they can do.  We shall see a process parallel to the way in which the use of atomic energy for bombs has been allowed to compromise the very necessary potentialities of the long-time use of atomic power to replace our oil and coal supplies, which are within centuries, if not decades, of utter exhaustion.  Note well that atomic bombs do not compete with power companies.

Let us remember that the automatic machine, whatever we think of any feelings it may have or may not have, is the precise economic equivalent of slave labor.  Any labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor.  It is perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment situation, in comparison with which the present recession and even the depression of the thirties will seem a pleasant joke.  This depression will ruin many industries – possibly even the industries which have taken advantage of the new potentialities.  However, there is nothing in the industrial tradition which forbids an industrialist to make a sure and quick profit, and to get out before the crash touches him personally.

Thus the new industrial revolution is a two-edged sword.  It may be used for the benefit of humanity, but only if humanity survives long enough to enter a period in which such a benefit is possible.  It may also be used to destroy humanity, and if it is not used intelligently it can go very far in that direction.  There are, however, hopeful signs on the horizon.  Since the publication of the first edition of this book, I have participated in two big meetings with representatives of business management, and I have been delighted to see that awareness on the part of a great many of those present of the social dangers of our new technology and the social obligations of those responsible for management to see that the new modalities are used for the benefit of man, for increasing his leisure and enriching his spiritual life, rather than merely for profits and the worship of the machine as a new brazen calf.  There are many dangers still ahead, but the roots of good will are there, and I do not feel as thoroughly pessimistic as I did at the time of the publication of the first edition of this book. (216-221)

Some Communication Machines and Their Future

When I say that the machine’s danger to society is not from the machine itself but from what man makes of it, I am really underlining the warning of Samuel Butler.  In Erewhon he conceives machines otherwise unable to act as conquering mankind by the use of men as the subordinate organs.  Nevertheless, we must not take Butler’s foresight too seriously, as in fact at his time neither he nor anyone around him could understand the true nature of the behavior of automata, and his statements are rather incisive figures of speech than scientific remarks.

Our papers have been making a great deal of American “know-how” ever since we had the misfortune to discover the atomic bomb.  There is one quality more important than “know-how” and we cannot accuse the United States of any undue amount of it.  This is “know-what” by which we determine not only how to accomplish our purposes, but what our purposes are to be.  I can distinguish between the two by an example.  Some years ago, a prominent American engineer bought an expensive player-piano.  It became clear after a week or two that this purchase did not correspond to any particular interest in the music played by the piano but rather to the overwhelming interest in the piano mechanism.  For this gentleman, the player-piano was not a means of producing music, but a means of giving some inventor the chance of showing how skillful he was at overcoming certain difficulties in the production of music.  This is an estimable attitude in a second-year high-school student.  How estimable it is in one of those on whom the whole cultural future of the country depends, I leave to the reader.

In the myths and fairy tales that we read as children we learned a few of the simpler and more obvious truths of life, such as that when a djinnee is found in a bottle, it had better be left there; that the fisherman who craves a boon from heaven too many times on behalf of his wife will end up exactly where he started; that if you are given three wishes, you must be very careful what you wish for.  These simple and obvious truths represent the childish equivalent of the tragic view of life which the Greeks and many modern Europeans possess, and which is somehow missing in this land of plenty.

The Greeks regarded the act of discovering fire with very split emotions.  On the one hand, fire was for them as for us a great benefit to all humanity.  On the other, the carrying down of fire from heaven to earth was a defiance of the Gods of Olympus, and could not but be punished by them as a piece of insolence toward their prerogatives.  Thus we see the great figure of Prometheus, the fire-bearer, the prototype of the scientist; a hero but a hero damned, chained on the Caucasus with vultures gnawing at his liver.  We read the ringing lines of Aeschylus in which the bound god calls on the whole world under the sun to bear witness to what torments he suffers at the hands of the gods.

The sense of tragedy is that the world is not a pleasant little nest made for our protection, but a vast and largely hostile environment, in which we can achieve great things only by defying the gods; and that this defiance inevitably brings its own punishment.  It is a dangerous world, in which there is no security, save the somewhat negative one of humility and restrained ambitions.  It is a world in which there is a condign punishment, not only for him who sins in conscious arrogance, but for him whose sole crime is ignorance of the gods and the world around him.

If a man with this tragic sense approaches, not fire, but another manifestation of original power, like the splitting of the atom, he will do so with fear and trembling.  He will not leap in where angels fear to tread, unless he is prepared to accept the punishment of the fallen angels.  Neither will he calmly transfer to the machine made in his own image the responsibility for his choice of good and evil, without continuing to accept a full responsibility for that choice.
I have said that the modem man, and especially the modern American, however much “know-how” he may have, has very little “know-what.”  He will accept the superior dexterity of the machine-made decisions without too much inquiry as to the motives and principles behind these.  In doing so, he will put himself sooner or later in the position of the father in W.W. Jacobs’ The Monkey’s Paw, who has wished for a hundred pounds, only to find at his door the agent of the company for which his son works, tendering him one hundred pounds as a consolation for his son’s death at the factory.  Or again, he may do it in the way of the Arab fisherman in the One Thousand and One Nights, when he broke the Seal of Solomon on the lid of the bottle which contained the angry djinnee.

Let us remember that there are game-playing machines both of The Monkey’s Paw type and of the type of the Bottled Djinnee.  Any machine constructed for the purpose of making decisions, if it does not possess the power of learning, will be completely literal-minded.  Woe to us if we let it decide our conduct, unless we have previously examined the laws of its action, and know fully that its conduct will be carried out on principles acceptable to us!  On the other hand, the machine like the djinnee which can learn and can make decisions on the basis of its learning, will in no way be obliged to make such decisions as we should have made, or will be acceptable to us.  For the man who is not aware of this, to throw the problem of his responsibility on the machine, whether it can learn or not, is to cast his responsibility to the winds, and to find it coming back seated on the whirlwind.

I have spoken of machines, but not only of machines having brains of brass and thews of iron.  When human atoms are knit into an organization in which they are used, not in their full right as responsible human beings, but as cogs and levers and rods, it matters little that their raw material is flesh and blood.  What is used as an element in a machine, is in fact an element in the machine.  Whether we entrust our decisions to machines of metal, or to those machines of flesh and blood which are bureaus and vast laboratories and armies and corporations, we shall never receive the right answers to our questions unless we ask the right questions.  The Monkey’s Paw of skin and bone is quite as deadly as anything cast out of steel and iron.  The djinnee which is a unifying figure of speech for a whole corporation is just as fearsome as if it were a glorified conjuring trick.

The hour is very late, and the choice of good and evil knocks at our door. (250-254)